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Heather Draper is Senior Lecturer in Biomedical Ethics at the University of Birmingham (Centre for Biomedical Ethics, Department of Primary Care and General Practice, Primary Care (T) Building, University of Birmingham, Edgbaston, Birmingham B15 2TT, UK. E-mail: h.draper{at}bham.ac.uk). She has been teaching medical/healthcare ethics (and some law) to medical students and postgraduates from a variety of healthcare backgrounds since the mid-1980s. She writes on a range of ethical issues, but her primary research focus is reproductive technology. Wendy Rogers is Associate Professor of Medical Ethics and Health Law in the School of Medicine at Flinders University, Adelaide, Australia. She currently teaches health law and ethics to students and practitioners in a range of healthcare professions. Her research interests include ethics of evidence-based medicine, ethical issues in general practice, feminist healthcare ethics and public health ethics.
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The use of case studies has several advantages. Potentially dry theoretical issues can be portrayed vividly, good practice disseminated, new or emerging issues highlighted and current practice challenged. Rarely, if ever, is the patients consent sought. Is this a serious breach of confidentiality?
| Confidentiality: traditional views |
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Kantian ethics
Kant reminds us of the absolute value of keeping our promises. In terms of medicine, this can be understood as an implied (Hippocratic) promise made by the medical profession that its members will not publish abroad any personal details disclosed by any patient during the course of professional contact. Many professionals, including those who work with children, now point out to patients the limitations of this promise. Healthcare professionals have, for instance, statutory obligations to disclose matters such as child abuse. In effect, doctors should no longer promise that everything disclosed will be kept secret.
Virtue ethics
Virtue ethics reminds us of the importance of discretion in the development of our moral characters and habits. Here, discretion can be considered to be the golden mean between the two (habitual) vices of indiscretion and secretiveness. This analysis suggests that, on occasions, it could be wrong to adhere rigidly to confidentiality; for example, it might be necessary to involve close relatives in the care of a patient and impossible to do this without keeping them informed to a certain degree. On the other hand, it is important only to disclose a minimum of information, only as much as is necessary to discharge ones obligations in caring for the patient or to meet legal obligations.
Human rights
The incorporation of the European Declaration of Rights into UK law has increased our understanding of rights theory and the significance of human rights. The Declaration reminds us that individuals have a right to privacy (a right to respect for private and family life, under Article 8), and that individuals who have privileged access to private information have a duty to ensure privacy, unless this right is outweighed by some competing right, such as the right to life. Thus, if a doctor knows that her patient poses a direct and immediate threat to the life of an identifiable person, that persons right to life may outweigh the patients right to privacy. However, this disclosure must still respect the patients privacy as far as possible and the doctor may be required not to disclose the patients identity unless this is unavoidable to protect the life in danger (Stone, 2001).
Consequentialism
Consequentialism reminds us that we need to take account of the consequences of our actions, and that it is difficult to adhere rigidly to any moral rule. Maintaining confidentiality is vital to the operation of effective healthcare delivery. In psychiatry the importance of the patients history which may include the most personal of details is obvious. Full and frank disclosure can be vital to diagnosis and treatment, but is unlikely to be forthcoming unless patients can trust doctors not to disclose this information indiscriminately. However, occasionally a balance has to be struck between the public interest in maintaining confidentiality and the public interest in disclosure, for example to prevent serious harm to an identified other. Notwithstanding the introduction of human rights legislation, English law generally reflects consequential thinking in emphasising the importance of confidentiality in the context of harms that may occur if confidentiality is privileged above other goods.
| Confidentiality in practice |
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Where does this leave us in terms of using patient information for teaching (Box 1
)? The GMC recognises that it may be used for teaching purposes and does not seem to require that consent is sought (see Publishing abroad, below). Often, clinical teaching is intra-disciplinary, for example psychiatric teaching given by psychiatrists to psychiatric registrars or medical students. In these cases, the assumption seems to be that information can be shared between members of the same profession, who abide by the same standards in terms of respecting confidentiality. Multidisciplinary teaching can lead to sharing information with professionals who may not be bound by these same standards. Involving an ethics specialist, for instance, often entails including someone who is not a member of the medical profession. Ethicists of all people should recognise the importance of confidentiality, but they have no professional code governing their behaviour, nor a professional body ensuring that a professional code could be enforced.
Box 1 Problems with current approaches to the use of patient information for publication or teaching
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Unlike sharing information for clinical care, teaching is only rarely in the immediate interests of the patient whose information is used (for instance, if the participants are involved in the patients continuing care). Perhaps the breach of confidentiality could be justified on the basis of the greater good in the way that some research is justified. But if this is the case, why not obtain consent, or at least review by an independent body such as an ethics committee, as is required when private information is used for research? In the next sections, we discuss some of the challenges associated with obtaining consent to use patient information or anonymising the information to protect confidentiality.
| Obstacles to gaining consent |
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Box 2 Summary of APTs instructions to authors regarding case studies
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The survey proved very instructive regarding the difficulties in obtaining consent. Of the 31 case histories found, in only just over half was it obvious that consent could have been obtained. In about a third of cases, the patients would not have been competent to consent. Some cases involved patients whose death formed part of the case history, making it impossible to obtain consent. In others, many people were involved and it was difficult to see whose consent was most relevant. For example, is it necessary to gain the consent of other healthcare professionals involved in the care of a patient when their attitudes, actions or behaviours are pertinent to the case? Finally, in some cases the issue under discussion concerned the propriety of disclosing certain information to patients. Therefore to have asked the patients permission to discuss the case would have pre-empted the outcome of the discussion by disclosing the controversial information under debate.
Patient refusal
In psychiatry, there are particular reasons why patients might not consent to having their information used for teaching or publication. Mental illness continues to attract prejudice such that many patients may wish to keep this part of their life as private as possible. Reviewing details of disordered thoughts or psychotic episodes may serve as an unwelcome reminder for the patient. Raising the question of this kind of use of patient information may lead some patients to lose their trust in their confidentiality being maintained.
| Competence |
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Minors and patients lacking capacity
Consent in the case of minors poses problems similar to those encountered with incompetent psychiatric patients, so it is worth considering the two groups together.
There are two moral and legal imperatives operating. First, parents in the UK have the legal privilege of consenting on behalf of incompetent minors to treatment, participation in clinical trials and use of case histories (but in England and Wales there is no legal proxy in the case of incompetent adults; Scotland has an Act for incompetent adults that permits some proxy consent). Second, clinicians are charged with acting in the interests of their incompetent patients, be they minors or adults.
If an intervention can reasonably be delayed until a minor is old enough, or sufficiently competent, to consent for himself or herself it is best practice to wait until this time. A similar delay would be best practice in the case of incompetent adults who are likely to regain capacity to consent.
Should this principle of delay be applied to the use of case histories in teaching and learning? The discussion of aspects of the care of an incompetent patient for teaching purposes is not in the interests of the patient concerned (although it might be in the interests of future patients). However, the value of publication or open discussion of a case in a teaching forum might be greatly reduced if it were delayed until a minor reached 18 years of age or an incompetent adult regained capacity. Long delays are likely to make a case significantly out of date.
If their case is anonymised (see next section) it is arguable that no harm will come to the minor or incompetent adult involved, but it is not clear whether this is sufficient justification for discussing it without their (future) consent. Given that discussion of the case is not in the patients medical interests, even though it is not contrary to these interests, it is not clear whether either the treating clinicians or the parents (in the case of children) are authorised to act on their behalf (although outside the medical context, parental consent for instance to the publication of school photographs would be the norm).
Thus if the rule on confidentiality were rigidly adhered to with children and incompetent adults, it would be unethical to discuss any case material, except in the context of the patients medical care. This suggests that any discussion, however generally useful, of aspects of a minors or incompetent adults care should not be used in teaching or published. Clearly, however, paediatric cases are used both for teaching purposes and in publications (in the latter instance, usually with parental consent, even though it is not clear whether parents do actually have the ethical authority to consent). In the case of incompetent adults, because there is no legal proxy in England and Wales, journals have to choose between refusing without exception to publish without consent, or to allowing some exceptions but putting safeguards in place to ensure good practice. However, this cannot include some form of substituted consent, as this is legally meaningless as the English law stands.
There are also cases where conflicts of interests may arise. For instance, the actions or behaviours of other parties often form part of a psychiatric medical history. Sometimes these are reported by the patient, sometimes they are observed by the staff caring for the patient. In some cases, the patients reports might be untrue or biased (consciously or unconsciously). Discussion of the patients veracity or the extent to which the patient is interpreting actions and behaviours might form part of the case discussion. The patient might be happy for the case to be discussed, but those whose actions or behaviours are reported might not be similarly content. The alleged behaviours might show them in a bad light or they might be unhappy about the dissemination of what they perceive to be misinformation about them. They might feel that, although the information is part of the patients medical record and the reports are clearly described as the patients feelings or interpretations, they should nevertheless be entitled to refuse consent to information allegedly about them being disclosed outside the treating team. It is not clear, however, whether this is their information at all, and therefore to what extent they are entitled to review it or give consent to its use in teaching or research when the rules of confidentiality are applied.
| Obstacles to anonymisation |
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Given the value of publications to individual and institutional prestige, it is probably unreasonable to expect authors to write anonymously. A requirement to do so in the interests of patient confidentiality would act as a disincentive to authors to write up cases for the benefit of the profession and future patients. In addition, the most interesting or valuable cases are likely to be unique, making anonymisation virtually impossible. Some patients may be able and willing to consent to publication, notwithstanding the limitations of anonymisation. Such consent would make publication permissible. But if the patient is unable to give consent, should the case history remain private between the patient and treating clinician? If a wider discussion of the case or dissemination of the care details would be in the interest of other patients, it may be in the public interest to consider using anonymised material without consent.
| Violation of privacy: the experience v. the principle |
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For instance, assuming that the experience of violation is central to the harm of disclosure, what if a case seems to be my case but, because it has been anonymised, I cant be sure that it is my case? If I cant be certain that this case refers to me, to what extent has my privacy been violated? I could write and ask the authors whether they have used my details without my consent, but I might be one of six such patients to make the same enquiry. Even if the authors actually had my case in mind when writing the article, the fact that five other people thought that it referred to them suggests that anonymisation was successful. It is not obvious that, under these circumstances, I could justifiably complain. Consequently, it is not clear whether the authors should have obtained my consent when the anonymised case might refer equally well to other individuals.
Ineffective anonymisation can lead to the experience of violation. An urgency to create a rule about publishing patient information was generated when a psychiatric patient recognised herself in an article published in a medical journal (Court, 1995). The assumption here must be that if the patient recognised herself, others might recognise her too. For others to be certain of her identity, however, they would already have to be aware of certain facts about her to associate the case with her; therefore at least some of her details would already be known to the reader. But this does not mean that the reader would not learn from the published case things that they did not know.
It is, however, worth noting that if the patient alone recognised herself and she chose not to mention this to anyone, no one else would learn any previously private information about her (as opposed to the case they were reading about). In this respect, her sense of violation might be misplaced to the extent that she as an identifiable person is not exposed if no one apart from her knows that the case is about her. To counter this point it must either be accepted that it is the patients sense of violation that counts, regardless of how justified this is, or that the experience or sense of violation is secondary to a principle of violation. The latter is discussed shortly; the former might fit these facts nicely, but could prove to be a hard rule to generalise to other circumstances. In addition, it raises the problem that patients might mistakenly recognise themselves in a case and feel violated, even though they are not the person on whom the case was based.
A possible alternative to using real case studies is to generate credible fictional accounts. To do this, however, authors must have certain objectives in mind and if these are related to a case in their experience one that raises particular clinical or ethical challenges, for instance it is difficult to see how the case can be truly fictional. It is more likely that it will contain ideas both from the originating case and from others known at first or second hand. It will therefore be a composite case based in fact. If my case contributes to such a composite case, my information enters the public domain, even if no one including myself associates it with me. To the extent that the information is not identifiable I am protected from a sense of violation of privacy, but nevertheless my information has been published abroad.
There is a further danger in accepting that it is the experience of violation that is the significant harm, for this would suggest that if a patient were dead or so cognitively impaired as never to be able to have a sense of violation, there is no need to respect confidentiality. The thought that the confidentiality of patients who have died or are incompetent is due the same respect as that of competent, living patients suggests that it is the principle of violation that is significant, rather than its experience. If, however, it is really a matter of principle, then the confidentiality rule is very rigid indeed. Even epidemiological studies that rely on non-identifiable, anonymised data gained without consent would be violations despite the unlikelihood that any of the information could ever be traced back to an individual either by that individual or by others. The same would be true of composite case studies. Yet it is widely accepted that, for various reasons, anonymised data can and should be used in research without consent. For example, seeking consent may lead to bias in the population studied, leading to invalid results; and for large population studies, the cost of trying to contact all those involved may be prohibitive.
| Publishing abroad: public interest on balance |
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You should tell patients how information about them may be used to protect public health, to undertake research and audit, to teach or train clinical staff and students and to plan and organise healthcare services (General Medical Council, 2004).
Further guidance is offered in relation to audit, but nothing more is said about teaching, although the GMCs general principle that unidentifiable information should be used wherever possible should probably be interpreted to cover teaching too. The specific objection of patients to use of their material for teaching purposes is not discussed, nor is any distinction between face-to-face teaching and publication of material.
Academic journals
It is not obvious that it is always an unethical breach of confidentiality to publish case material in a medical or research journal without consent, particularly where it is unlikely that the patient or anyone else could make a positive identification. Indeed, it is arguable that the public interest in dissemination to the medical profession might outweigh even a patients objection if the case poses unique issues. Although publication of a case in a medical journal does introduce that material into the public domain, we might consider this to be significantly different from publication in, for example, a tabloid newspaper. Nevertheless, academic journals can be accessed by the general public and they are regularly scanned by the media for newsworthy stories.
Teaching materials
It might be argued that patient information used in face-to-face medical teaching and training remains within the domain of the same or related professions. But the distinction between using patient information in publications and in teaching might not be as robust as first appears: teaching materials can also enter the public domain. For instance, a case history used for training in one group may be carried by members of that group into other groups. Participants at a teaching session or conference may be more careless about the disposal or securing of training notes than their own patients notes. Training packs and course handouts might easily, and innocently, be read by a students flatmates. Overheads for meetings and lectures are sometimes placed on the internet. Even medical professionals might not take a disseminated case study to be as confidential as their own patients records. The wider this dissemination, the more the patients information is published abroad. Bearing in mind the obstacles to anonymisation discussed above, it is likely that some patients will be identifiable even where efforts have been taken to avoid this.
These points obviously indicate that great care should be taken of training materials that include case studies. However, it is unlikely that they amount to a strong reason for not using case materials in teaching. The value of teaching, and the extent to which this value is enhanced by using actual cases, is likely to be regarded as outweighing the harm of accidental violations that may occur.
What is in the public interest?
One way to resolve the dilemma surrounding the use of patient information in medical education and research is to take a lead from guidance on the involvement of incompetent patients in research, the key points of which are listed in Box 3
. The essence of these guidelines is that, unless incompetent patients participate in research, as a group either they will not benefit from it or benefit will be retarded as advances resulting from trials on competent patients will be applied on an individual and ad hoc basis. We believe that a similar public interest argument is valid in the use of case material without consent if it is not possible to gain consent, provided that the authors adhere to the criteria listed in Box 4
. This change of principle would primarily but not exclusively affect psychiatry, learning disability studies and paediatrics.
Box 3 Summary of principles for recruitment in research trials of patients who lack capacity to consent
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Box 4 Criteria justifying the use in teaching or educational publications of case material without consent
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| Conclusions |
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Part of the harm caused to someone whose personal information is disclosed results from a sense of violation. We need to follow a principle of non-violation but it should perhaps be applied judiciously. It would not be in the public interest to apply this principle too rigorously, as this would prohibit the use of any personal information without consent, even that which was completely unidentifiable. This argument has already influenced limited disclosure for epidemiological research and should extend to information disclosed for teaching, even though the risks of violation in this case are greater and the material might be published. This justification applies particularly to material that requires urgent public and transparent discussion, or cases concerning those who are incapable of giving consent and are likely to remain so for so long as to render redundant eventual use with consent. Thus, an argument can be made for relaxing to this limited degree the demand of most medical journals that case material will not be published without consent.
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| Footnotes |
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For invited commentaries on this article see pp. 122123 and pp. 123124, this issue. | References |
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Court, C. (1995) GMC finds doctors not guilty in consent case. BMJ, 311, 12451246.
General Medical Council (2004) Confidentiality: Protecting and Providing Information. http://www.gmc-uk.org/standards/secret.htm.
Rogers, W. & Draper, H. (2003) The ethics of confidentiality in medical ethics. Journal of Medical Ethics, 29, 220224.
Royal College of Psychiatrists (2004) Advances in Psychiatric Treatment: Instructions for Authors. http://apt.rcpsych.org/misc/ifora.shtml.
Stone, D. (2001) Confidentiality, access to health records and the Human Rights Act 1988. In Healthcare Law: Impact of the Human Rights Act 1998 (eds A. Garwood-Gowers, J. Tingle & T. Lewis), pp. 127146. London: Cavendish Publishing.
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