David Kingdon is Professor of Mental Health Care Delivery at the University of Southampton (Department of Mental Health, University of Southampton, Royal South Hants Hospital, Brintons Terrace, Southampton SO14 0YG, UK. Email: dgk{at}soton.ac.uk) and Honorary Consultant Psychiatrist to Hampshire Partnership Trust. His clinical work is based on an acute in-patient ward, providing specialist opinion and management. He has researched cognitive therapy and mental health service delivery.
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Indeed personality disorder in itself could and should be described as a term of abuse. It damns an individuals core being – their personality – as disordered, thus perpetuating and amplifying the abusive experiences that so many have experienced in childhood. Appleby, before taking his current position of influence, was co-author of an excellent, thought-provoking paper suggesting personality disorder to be a diagnosis used for those patients psychiatrists dislike (Lewis & Appleby, 1988). To add the terms dangerous and severe labels the individual inexorably for a lifetime of ostracism and denigration. As psychiatric diagnoses, DSPD and, broadly, personality disorder lack precision, validity and reliability (Laptook et al, 2006) although this is certainly not a unique position in current classification systems. As it becomes clearer that schizophrenia and depression can have features originating in childhood (Schiffman et al, 2004) and certainly can have enduring effects on relationships, the customary criteria for personality disorder also differentiate less and less. The positive findings of follow-up studies of personality disorder suggest that this is not necessarily a life-long disorder (Zanarini et al, 2003), although some characteristics may persist in some people, again as with schizophrenia and depression.
The government does now seem to be restraining itself from using the term DSPD in its legislative forays, gradually retreating towards positions of consensus and common sense. But it continues to be used in the context of the treatment units established in its more gung-ho days as described by Howells and colleagues (2007, this issue). We have argued that naming is very important in addressing stigma (Kingdon et al, 2007) in the context of schizophrenia and would argue similarly here. Whats wrong with you? cannot be adequately answered symptomatically with, for example, I experience paranoia or I have a behaviour disorder or even less I have an individualised formulation, however important that may be therapeutically. The group identified for intervention are those who have been convicted by the courts. Many have a combination of criminal behaviour and features of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) (Spitzer et al, 2006). They differ from people presenting with PTSD in some ways, generally because their traumatic experiences have been repeated – often because of accompanying parental neglect – and a more suitable descriptor for these individuals, as with many described as having personality disorder, might be either PTSD (repeated episodes), i.e. PTSD following repeated traumatic episodes, or what Spitzer et al(2006) call complex PTSD (Box 1
).
Box 1 Diagnostic criteria for complex PTSD
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Personality as manifested through temperament and character is an important consideration in any stress–vulnerability model of mental and behavioural conditions, probably as the major mediator of genetic effects, and different aspects of personality can present as strengths or weaknesses, depending on circumstances. Personality disorder is therefore an anomalous, and for the most part unhelpful, term which has probably survived because of a reluctance to use a diagnosis of mental illness in a group of people who until relatively recently did not seem to benefit from psychiatric interventions. However, this is also due to confusion about what a diagnosis of mental illness may mean and the mixed messages given – if they are ill, shouldnt they be absolved of responsibility for their actions; if bad (or personality disordered) they should be fully responsible. The use of the broader and more neutral term mental condition might reduce such confusion (Kingdon & Young, 2007). Management issues are not dependent on whether someone is ill but whether they can benefit from interventions – as is the case in this instance with complex PTSD. It does not exclude behavioural intervention (e.g. custodial sentences) where protection of the public is warranted and individuals are given the opportunity to learn from the consequences of their actions.
Gender issues are relevant. Broadly speaking, following similar life experiences, men present with a combination of complex PTSD, criminal conviction and aggression equating to a diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder; women with borderline or emotionally unstable personality disorder. None of these terms is particularly accurate. People who attract these diagnoses, male or female, can be very sociable and charming individuals who unfortunately include in their repertoire of emotional coping skills activities that involve breaking the law or causing harm to themselves. And borderline with what? There is certainly overlap with psychosis, merging into a traumatic psychosis (Kingdon & Turkington, 2005) but on a continuum, not just sitting near some arbitrary border. Emotionally unstable likewise is a strange term for use in classification and sounds quite judgemental – labile maybe, especially when under stress, but unstable?
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The argument against separate units is that this involves discrimination against a group who are not therefore being treated with their peers. This can perpetuate the stigmatisation described above and deprive them of access to services available locally in their community. Balanced against this is that if they remained in standard prison facilities, treatment would be much more difficult and if they were transferred to hospital, risk to others would be more difficult to manage. However, the DSPD label will make it more difficult for this group to move on into local services when they are judged to be ready and this is a very important practical reason to change the terminology.
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See pp. 325–332, this issue. |
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D. Kingdon Author's reply: The British Journal of Psychiatry, January 1, 2008; 192(1): 71 - 71. [Full Text] [PDF] |
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