|
|
|||||||||||
John Bellhouse is research registrar at the Section of Developmental Psychiatry, University of Cambridge (Department of Psychiatry, Section of Developmental Psychiatry, University of Cambridge, Douglas House, 18b Trumpington Road, Cambridge CB2 2AH), where he has studied the capacity of new admissions to psychiatric wards to consent to their admission and treatment. Tony Holland is a lecturer at the Department of Psychiatry, University of Cambridge, and a consultant psychiatrist with an interest in learning disabilities at Lifespan NHS Trust. Isobel Clare is a clinical and forensic psychologist at the Department of Psychiatry, University of Cambridge. Michael Gunn is Professor of Law and Head of the Department of Academic Legal Studies, Nottingham Law School, Nottingham Trent University.
In English Law, an adult has the right to make decisions affecting his or her own life, whether the reasons for that choice are rational, irrational, unknown or even non-existent. This right remains even if the outcome of the decision might be detrimental to the individual (Re T (Adult: Refusal of Treatment), 1992) or to a viable foetus (Re S (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment), 1992). However, such a right to self-determination is meaningful only if the individual is appropriately informed, has the ability (capacity) to make the decision and is free to decide without coercion (Grisso, 1986).
The concept of capacity lies at the heart of an adult's right to make legally significant decisions such as giving or withholding consent to treatment, making a will, entering into a contract and marrying (see British Medical Association & Law Society, 1995). In recent years, its meaning has been explored within English law in several important legal cases (e.g. Re C (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment), 1994; Re T (Adult: Refusal of Treatment), 1992). It has also been explored in the scientific literature with reference to the law in the USA (Grisso & Appelbaum, 1998) and Japan (Kitamura et al, 1998). A definition of incapacity has been produced in England and Wales (Law Commission, 1995), and this has been adopted in the Government';s proposed legislation for decision-making on behalf of people without capacity, Making Decisions (Lord Chancellor, 1999). The Expert Committee on reform of the Mental Health Act (MHA) 1983 has recommended that a capacity-based approach to decisions about compulsory admission and treatment should be included in any new mental health legislation (Department of Health, 1999). The Expert Committee adopted the Law Commission's definition of capacity.
The emphasis of our article is practical, and it draws both on the literature (Grisso & Appelbaum, 1998; Wong et al, 1999) and on our experience as practitioners and researchers. We consider two main issues. First, we discuss the legal concept of the capacity of adults in medicine, surgery and psychiatry (Shaw (2001) considers the legal situation regarding children and young people). Second, we present a framework for assessing capacity to consent to a health care intervention. We focus on a specific common situation that of the patient who refuses a proposed health care intervention (a more general discussion of capacity appears in Wong et al (1999)) and on English law. However, the general principles should apply to other legal systems with different criteria for defining capacity.
| The definition of capacity |
|---|
|
|
|---|
The Law Commission also makes the following points. First, adults who do not have a mental disorder cannot be considered to be without capacity. Second, mental disability is defined as "any disability or disorder of the mind or brain whether permanent or temporary which results in a disturbance or impairment of mental functioning" (Law Commission, 1995: p. 36). Third, decision-making capacity should not be considered to be a stable, global characteristic that an individual with a mental disability either has or has not. It might vary depending on the subject of the decision and it might change over time. Moreover, it depends not only on the decision-maker but also on the characteristics of the decision, including its complexity and the way in which it is presented. Fourth, assessment of capacity should be based on the balance of probabilities.
| Box 1. The Law Commission's definition of incapacity A person is without capacity if at the material time he or she is :
(Law Commission, 1995: pp. 3738)
|
| Principles of capacity assessment |
|---|
|
|
|---|
A functional approach to the assessment of decision-making capacity is explicit in the Law Commission's recommendations and subsequent proposals (Law Commission, 1995: p. 32). Empirical studies have supported the feasibility of such an approach (Wong et al, 2000). However, status and outcome approaches are used at present and these will continue to play a role in new legislation. Under the provisions of the MHA 1983, it is the status of an individual (i.e., whether he or she has a mental disorder of a particular nature or degree) that determines whether his or her decision may be overridden. The person's capacity to make the decision does not have to be considered. There may be occasions when the outcome of a decision alerts the health care practitioner to the need for more detailed questioning of an individual's capacity (for example, if a person rejects prescribed medication after a long period of acceptance). However, in routine clinical practice such alerts usually arise only when medical advice is refused: the capacity of people who agree to treatment is rarely considered. The conundrum presented by adults who are without capacity in relation to a particular decision but are assenting, as in R v Bournewood Community and Mental Health NHS Trust (1998), will be considered in a future issue of APT (Dickenson, 2001).
| Box 2. Approaches to assessing decision-making capacity Functional The components of the decision-making process are analysed Outcome The quality of the decision-making process is rated on the basis of the projected consequences of the decision Status An attribute of the decision-maker (e.g. a diagnosis) is used to evaluate the quality of the decision
|
| Capacity and the Mental Health Act 1983 |
|---|
|
|
|---|
Although capacity assessment is therefore not central to the application of the MHA 1983, it is relevant to specific situations. The most frequent of these are the continuation of treatment beyond 3 months for detained patients (Section 58) and electroconvulsive therapy, both of which require either consent or the opinion of a second doctor appointed by the MHA Commission. In these contexts, it is clear that the patient must have the capacity to give or withhold consent (Jones, 1999). Under Section 57, treatments such as psychosurgery and the implantation of sex hormones require both consent (and capacity to consent) and the agreement of a second-opinion doctor.
The present situation, in which an adult with capacity can refuse treatment for a physical disorder, but not (if detained) for a mental disorder seems odd and, indeed, discriminatory. The case of Re C (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment (1994)) illustrates the point. The Court ruled that C, who had gangrene of one leg, had the capacity to decide whether or not to consent to amputation. Since he withheld his consent to this treatment it could not lawfully proceed. In contrast, there was no requirement to assess his decision-making capacity with respect to treatment of his mental disorder, schizophrenia. He could be forced to have treatment for this under the MHA 1983, even though he might have had capacity to decide against it. The difference in criteria regarding consent for the two categories of health problem is of particular interest given that, in contrast to the gangrene, the schizophrenia was not thought to present any threat to C's life.
Thus, when considering the treatment of physical disorders the decision of a capable adult must be respected, even if the outcome is likely to be his or her death. In the case of a mental disorder, the MHA 1983 allows treatment without consent, even if the risks (e.g. to health) of not having treatment may be less serious and even if the person concerned has the capacity to make the decision.
In its proposals for reform of the MHA 1983 (Department of Health, 1999), the Expert Committee suggested that the inclusion of a capacity test would be consistent with one of its stated principles, that of non-discrimination, meaning that people with mental and with physical health problems should not be treated differently. The case for bringing all health care decisions within the same legislative framework has also been strongly argued by others (Szmukler & Holloway, 2000; Zigmond & Holland, 2000).
| Capacity in physical medicine |
|---|
|
|
|---|
| Capacity assessment in practice |
|---|
|
|
|---|
The issue of capacity and treatment refusal arises frequently in non-psychiatric practice. A psychiatrist may then be asked to give an opinion, for example regarding the role of psychiatric disorder in influencing a patient's decision-making ability. In such cases, it is important to remember that the decision whether or not to proceed with treatment remains with the treating doctor or other health practitioner.
There may be other reasons for psychiatric involvement in non-psychiatric cases. For example, a practitioner may believe that all non-compliance is a psychiatric issue or may misunderstand the role of the MHA in non-psychiatric practice. It is therefore important to be clear why a colleague is seeking a psychiatric opinion and to correct at an early stage any misconceptions.
A lack of capacity to make a particular health care decision is only one possible explanation of a person's rejection of advice. An individual might not want the treatment, might have been poorly informed or might feel unable to make a decision because of anxiety about the treatment.
| Advising about capacity to make a health care decision |
|---|
|
|
|---|
Being able to consent to a particular health care decision requires that the person concerned is, first, appropriately informed and, second, has the capacity to make a decision based on the relevant information. Thus, in determining whether a person has the capacity to make a particular decision practitioners must be aware of the relevant information themselves and be able to determine whether an individual has the ability to use that information to arrive at a decision and to communicate that choice. Therefore, the person responsible for treatment is usually involved in the assessment process, as he or she will be best informed about the nature of the treatment proposed and the risks and benefits of proceeding or not.
A patient making a particular health care decision needs to be made aware of the relevant facts. Box 3
lists the key information that the law requires be understood by the patient. It is important to be aware that the level of knowledge of the procedure in question is "in broad terms" and is not the level of knowledge considered essential in negligence cases (see Sidaway v Board of Governors of Bethlem Royal and Maudsley Hospital, 1984). This is particularly important when considering the level of knowledge required of the risks of a procedure.
| Box 3. Making a health care decision To make a health care decision the individual must understand in broad terms: The nature of the intervention The purpose of the intervention The risks and benefits of the intervention The risks of not carrying out the intervention The risks and benefits of alternative interventions
|
Deciding what to do when a patient will not cooperate with a capacity assessment can be difficult. The legal position that an adult is presumed to have capacity unless it is demonstrated otherwise must be balanced against the need to ensure that incapable people are not denied essential medical treatment. The urgency of the proposed treatment and the evidence pointing towards a disorder likely to affect a person's capacity must be taken into account.
| Determining capacity |
|---|
|
|
|---|
Hospital admission can be considered as a special case, where the intervention is the admission itself. The information relevant to an admission decision has never been explored in English Law, but Hoge (1994) reviews this issue from an American perspective.
If a patient's understanding of the above issues differs from that of the body of medical opinion, it is important to probe the basis of this difference in detail. It is unacceptable for a finding of incapacity to be made without making every attempt to communicate the relevant knowledge (see Strategies to improve capacity).
| Assessment of mental state |
|---|
|
|
|---|
| Strategies to improve capacity |
|---|
|
|
|---|
Attention to communication problems
It is essential that the person assessed can hear and see adequately. The advice of speech and language therapists might assist communication, for instance in those with dysphasia. A competent interpreter will be needed if the patient does not speak English and the psychiatrist does not speak the patient's native tongue. In borderline cases, where the command of English of a non-English speaker appears adequate but the treatment issues are not understood, an interpreter might reveal whether misunderstanding is due to the patient's poor English.
Presenting information in a simpler form
There is evidence that breaking information down helps people understand it better. In those with limited verbal skills, visual aids can improve understanding (Grisso & Appelbaum, 1995; Wong et al, 2000).
Treatment of mental disability
It may be possible to defer decisions until treatment has improved an incapacitating disorder. The likely time span for improvement, the expected degree of improvement and its likely effect on capacity must be carefully considered.
| Dilemmas in capacity assessment |
|---|
|
|
|---|
The level of information required
The legal definition of broad terms may be hard to interpret in practice. Does comprehension of cancer require the use of that word, or are swelling, growth, tumour or neoplasm adequate? Most would agree that implicit in the term cancer is malignancy, or potential for distant spread, and that this is not implicit in any of the other words. The treating doctor needs to determine the key components relevant to diagnosis and prognosis and to be sure that the terms used by both parties are properly understood.
Pessimism
Patients do not always see risk/benefit calculations in the same way that specialists do. Probability may be poorly understood and patients might be naturally pessimistic in their outlook. Pessimism may be due to a depressive disorder, in which case the influence of this mental disorder on the person's capacity must be evaluated. On the other hand, specialists may be overoptimistic in their evaluation of the success of their interventions.
Abnormal mental experiences
It will probably be simple to elicit and agree on the effect of cognitive impairment on decision-making capacity. However, the influence of grandiose thinking, delusional beliefs, depression, etc. may be more complex and open to different interpretations. This leads to the potential for less reliable and more contentious judgements about capacity.
Religious and spiritual beliefs
Refusal of a blood transfusion or other procedures owing to literal interpretation of texts relating to religious beliefs is not uncommon. A clear distinction between delusional belief and religious belief can be drawn by considering the history of a person's belief, his or her usual customs and the social recognition given to that particular faith. This interesting area is considered in detail by Waldfogel & Meadows (1996).
Avoiding coercion
An important consideration is the question of voluntariness. A patient should make a decision him- or herself. Difficulties can arise if people close to the patient have an undue, and perhaps unhelpful, influence over the patient and if the patient feels pressured to consent by professional staff. A supportive, private and non-judgemental atmosphere is essential.
| After the determination of decision-making capacity |
|---|
|
|
|---|
| People with capacity who refuse treatment |
|---|
|
|
|---|
Some treating doctors feel angry when a patient refuses an intervention and take the attitude that if patients do not follow their advice they can go elsewhere. However, there is a legal and moral imperative for health professionals to remain engaged. If a bad outcome ensues, it is important to know that everything possible was done to ensure that the patient received the best treatment in keeping with his or her wishes. For example, symptom relief should be offered where definitive treatment is refused.
| Treatment of people lacking capacity |
|---|
|
|
|---|
The absence of any statute law in England and Wales that enables substitute decision-making means that there is no ready means of appeal if there is disagreement over what is in the patient's best interests. Mr. L in the Bournewood judgment (R v Bournewood Community and Mental Health NHS Trust, 1998) lacked the capacity to give or refuse consent to hospital admission and the health professionals concerned arranged admission against the wishes of his paid carers. His initial admission was justified under common law, although subsequently he was placed under Section 3 of the MHA 1983 and on appeal was discharged to the care of his paid carers. This is evidence of a serious gap in mental health law that has been recognised by the House of Lords. The proposed Mental Incapacity Act may well resolve this issue, but at present there is no indication when such a Bill will be put before Parliament.
| Record-keeping |
|---|
|
|
|---|
| Conclusions |
|---|
|
|
|---|
The issue of individuals who accept treatment but lack capacity will continue to vex lawyers and policy-makers. In psychiatric practice, the refusal of treatment is a more pressing concern, and a focus on the decision-making process of those who refuse may make the psychiatrists' assessments simpler and more transparent. Issues of capacity and consent can be difficult and it is good practice to seek advice and discuss findings with colleagues, including those who are not medical practitioners. Legal advice may also be appropriate. In some situations the courts make the final decision (e.g., to allow a sterilisation operation).
The determination that a patient lacks the capacity to make a particular health care decision does not imply consent. It places a duty on the treating health care professional to determine and justify a course of action that is both in the patient's best interests and the least invasive and restrictive option, considering all relevant facts. Good practice includes consultation with family or carers, if time allows. If there is uncertainty the practitioner should err on the side of saving life but, in the case of physical disorder, a capable adult has the right to refuse treatment and this must be respected.
| Multiple choice questions |
|---|
|
|
|---|
|
| References |
|---|
|
|
|---|
Department of Health (1999) Reform of the Mental Health Act 1983. London: Stationery Office.
Dickinson, D. (2001) Decision-making competence in adults: a philosopher's viewpoint. Advances in Psychiatric Treatment, 7, in press.
Grisso, T. (1986) Evaluating Competencies: Forensic Assessments and Instruments. New York: Plenum.
Grisso, T. & Appelbaum, P. S. (1995) The MacArthur Treatment Competence Study. III. Abilities of patients to consent to psychiatric and medical treatments. Law and Human Behavior, 19, 149173.[CrossRef][Medline]
Grisso, T. & Appelbaum (1998) Assessing Competence to Consent to Treatment: A Guide for Physicians and Other Health Professionals. New York: Oxford University Press.
Hoge, S. (1994) On being "too crazy" to sign into a mental hospital: the issue of consent to psychiatric hospitalisation. Bulletin of the American Academy of Law and Psychiatry, 25, 531540.
Jones, R. M. (1999) The Mental Health Act Manual (6th edn). London: Sweet and Maxwell.
Kitamura, F., Tomoda, A., Tsukada, K., et al (1998) Method for assessment of competency to consent in the mentally ill: rationale, development and comparison with the medically ill. International Journal of Law and Psychiatry, 21, 223244.[CrossRef][Medline]
Law Commission (1995) Mental Incapacity: A Summary of the Law Conmmission's Recommendations (LC231). London: Stationery Office.
Lord Chancellor (1999) Making Decisions. The Government's Proposal's for Makiing Decisions of Behalf of Mentally Incapacitated Adults: A report Issued in the Light of Responses to the Consulation Paper "Who Decides?" (Cm44650). London: Stationery Office.
Shaw, M. (2001) Competence and consent to treatment in children and adolescent. Advances in Psychiatric Treatment, 7, 150159.
Szmukler, G. & Holloway, F. (2000) Reform of the Mental Health Act: health or safety? British Journal of Psychiatry, 177, 196200.
Waldfogel, S. & Meadows, S. (1996) Religious issues in the capacity evaluation. General Hospital Psychiatry, 18, 173182.[Medline]
Wong, J., Clare, I. C. H., Gunn, M., et al (1999) Capacity to make health care decisions: its importance in clinical practice. Psychological Medicine, 29, 437446.[CrossRef][Medline]
Wong, J., Clare, Watson, P., et al (2000) The capacity of people with a "mental disability" to make a health care decision. Psychological Medicine, 30, 295306.[CrossRef][Medline]
Zigmond, A. & Holland, A. J. (2000) Unethical mental health law: history repeats itself. Journal of Mental Health Law, 3, 4956.
R v Bournewood Community and Mental Health NHS Trust, ex parte L [1998] 3 AllER 289.
Re C (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment [1994] AllER 819.
Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990a] 2 AC 1.
Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990b] 4 BMLR 1.
Re S (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment [1992] 4 AllER 671.
Re T (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1992] 4 AllER 649.
Sidaway v Board of Governors of Bethlem Royal and Maudsley Hospital [1984] 1 AllER 643.
This article has been cited by other articles:
![]() |
D. S. Baldwin and N. Kosky Off-label prescribing in psychiatric practice Advan. Psychiatr. Treat., November 1, 2007; 13(6): 414 - 422. [Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF] |
||||
![]() |
J. Ewbank and R. Macgregor-Morris Decision-making capacity and consent to treatment Advan. Psychiatr. Treat., March 1, 2002; 8(2): 158 - 159. [Full Text] [PDF] |
||||
| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| HOME | HELP | FEEDBACK | SUBSCRIPTIONS | ARCHIVE | SEARCH | TABLE OF CONTENTS |
| British Journal of Psychiatry | Psychiatric Bulletin | All RCPsych Journals |